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The Sixth Circuit Dropped the Ball: An Analysis of
Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School
Athletic Ass’n in Light of the Supreme Court’s Recent
Trends in State Action Jurisprudence
I. INTRODUCTION
If you ask any junior high or high school student what they most
like about school, a significant number of them will unblinkingly respond, “Playing sports.”1 For the most part, this is a uniquely American phenomenon because, unlike many countries where organized
sports “are tied to community-based athletic clubs,” organized
sports in the United States are primarily tied to schools.2 These
schools, in turn, have ties to the state, and it is from actions by the
state that students are protected by the Constitution.
The Constitution is limited, however, in its ability to shield statesponsored interscholastic sports. Despite the best contentions of
“Johnny or Jane,” their parents, or their coaches that “Johnny and
Jane” have a right to play football or cheer for the squad, no court
has ever recognized such a right. In fact, all federal circuit courts that
have considered this contention have consistently held that there is
no such thing as a constitutional right to participate in interscholastic
athletics.3 Furthermore, because high school athletics are inextricably
tied to the several states’ education programs and not to any federal
program, it is state law and policy, rather than constitutional or federal law, which guides these programs. Therefore, the only effective
way a person can make out a federal issue when attempting to protect their school “sports rights” is either through the indirect path of

1. See generally FRANK L. SMOLL & RONALD E. SMITH, CHILDREN AND YOUTH IN
SPORT: A BIOPSYCHOSOCIAL PERSPECTIVE 37–39 (1996) (noting participation rates in interscholastic athletics by sport, gender, age, and race).
2. ROBERT S. GRIFFIN, SPORTS IN THE LIVES OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS:
SUCCESS ON THE FIELD AND IN LIFE 69 (1998).
3. See, e.g., Alerding v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 779 F.2d 315 (6th Cir. 1985);
Niles v. Tex. Univ. Interscholastic League, 715 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1983); Hebert v. Ventetuolo, 638 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1981); Moreland v. W. Pa. Athletic Ass’n, 572 F.2d 121 (3d Cir.
1978); Albach v. Odle, 531 F.2d 983 (10th Cir. 1976).
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the incorporation doctrine of the Fourteenth Amendment4 to the
states or through the Civil Rights Act of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.5 It must
be emphasized that the individual rights and liberties that the Constitution and its amendments protect apply only to “state actions”
or, in other words, only to the actions of any federal, state, or local
government.6 To put it another way, neither the Constitution nor
any of its amendments provides any protections against private conduct no matter how unfair or egregious that conduct may be7 unless
that action can be traced back to some source of state action.
Recently, the Sixth Circuit held that Tennessee’s Secondary
School Athletic Association (“TSSAA”), which traditionally makes all
of the rules and guidelines that govern high school athletics for that
state, is not a state actor.8 This is groundbreaking. Every federal circuit court and every state’s highest court that has ever entertained
the issue of whether state high school athletic associations are state
actors has nodded in the affirmative.9 Therefore, these athletic associations have always had to scrupulously watch that they do not step
4. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part: “No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Furthermore, whether an aggrieved party seeks a remedy under either the Fourteenth Amendment or under § 1983, any court’s “state action” analysis is the same because “[t]he ‘under
color of law’ in Section 1983 means the same as the ‘state action’ requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment.” See Pearson v. Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, No. IP 99-1857-C-T/G,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11913, at *17 n.6 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 8, 2000); see also United States v.
Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966), overruling recognized in Gresham Park Cmty. Org. v.
Howell, 652 F.2d 1227 (5th Cir. 1981).
6. 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 758 (3d ed. 1999).
7. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948). The one exception being the Thirteenth Amendment, “which abolishes the institution of slavery, [and which] is directed [] to
controlling the actions of private individuals.” ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 6, at 758.
8. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 180 F.3d 758, 766
(6th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 1156 (2000), rev’d, No. 99-901, 2001 U.S. LEXIS
964 (Feb. 20, 2001).
9. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 190 F.3d 705, 706–
07 (6th Cir. 1999), denying reh’g to 180 F.3d 758 (6th Cir. 1999).
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on anyone’s constitutional toes—always until now. The Brentwood
decision has set off a tremor in this formerly stable area of state action law.
Although the Sixth Circuit’s Brentwood court understandably
interpreted the Supreme Court’s relevant state action cases to effectively limit, if not eliminate, finding state action in the actions of
many private entities, the Sixth Circuit went too far when it held that
the actions of the TSSAA are not state actions. Consequently, this
decision unduly expands the several states’ legal authority, through
their athletic associations to slight, if not trample, the constitutional
protections traditionally afforded students and schools engaged in
states’ interscholastic athletic programs.
First and foremost, this Note discusses why the Sixth Circuit
wandered off the state actor charts in its Brentwood holding. Part II
provides the necessary background for understanding the Brentwood
court’s analysis by explicating (1) the three prominent tests in the
“state actor” field; (2) the pivotal Blum Trilogy of cases; and (3) the
other federal circuits’ respectively unanimous holdings that state interscholastic athletic associations are state actors. Part III examines
the factual specifics that underlie the Brentwood decision. Part IV
focuses on the Brentwood court’s analysis, particularly the court’s
troubling analysis rooted in its interpretation of the Supreme Court’s
Tarkanian Footnote 13. Part V critiques not only the Brentwood
court’s analysis but also calls for a re-examination of the Supreme
Court’s recent analysis in this area of state action. Part V also offers a
solution on how to correct this area of the law, which, of late, has
elevated form over substance. Part VI offers a brief synthesis, and because the Supreme Court reversed and remanded Brentwood back to
the Sixth Circuit while this Note neared the final phases of the editing process prior to publication, Part VII provides a necessary postscript, though certainly not the last word in this gapingly gray area of
constitutional law.10

10. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, No. 99-901, 2001
U.S. LEXIS 964 (Feb. 20, 2001). Although the Supreme Court’s decision ultimately decided
some of the narrower issues pertinent only to the Brentwood case, the 5-4 Court, if anything,
continued to muddy the waters of state action jurisprudence. See infra Parts V and VII.
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II. BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court began applying the Fourteenth Amendment
to the states with the Civil Rights Cases.11 In these cases, the Court’s
majority held that restricting Blacks from accessing public accommodations or public conveyances is not unconstitutional because it is
merely a harm between private persons; therefore, there is no constitutional remedy.12 In some instances where a person’s constitutional
rights or liberties have been harmed, it is clear that the alleged
wrongdoer is (or is not) a state actor and, therefore, it is clear
whether the courts may (or may not) afford a remedy. However, the
governmental status of the wrongdoer is frequently unclear, despite
claims that it is a non-state actor and, therefore, incapable of violating the Constitution.13 Over the course of the recent century, the
Supreme Court has developed the following tests to determine
whether these seemingly private actors may actually be ascribed as
state actors: (1) the Public Function14 test; (2) the Nexus15 test; and
(3) the Mutual Contacts16 test.17

11. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). See David J. Pierguidi, Note, Absent Strong Connections to a
State Government, a High School Athletic Association Cannot Be Construed as a State Actor:
Brentwood v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n, 180 F.3d 758 (6th Cir. 1999), cert.
granted, 120 S. Ct. 1156 (2000), 10 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 457, 458–59 (2000).
12. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 6, at 766–67.
13. See id. at 759.
14. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 371 (1974); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506–07 (1946).
15. Or state compulsion/coercion test. See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002
(1982); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 456 U.S. 922, 941 (1982); Adickes v. S.H. Kress &
Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
16. Or licensing, symbiotic, subsidies, “catch-all,” or other joint action or entanglement
test. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 6, at 796–817. Mutual contacts is really Nowak and
Rotunda’s “catch-all” category for all the various direct and indirect means the Supreme Court
has used to determine the level of relationship between so-called private actors and the state.
See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175 (1972).
17. The author has chosen these italicized state action test labels because many legal
scholars in the field prefer them. Moreover, the author has not placed the additional state action labels in the footnotes to confuse the reader but to provide a sample list of synonymous
names and descriptions that may connect with many readers.
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A. A Brief Preview of the State Action Tests
1. The Public Function test
When using the public function test to determine whether a
seemingly private actor has assumed state actor status, the courts
consider whether the private actor’s activity is one that government
has traditionally done (e.g., holding elections).18 For example, in
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,19 a private utility company terminated a woman’s electrical service.20 She called state action theory
into play when she noted that the state licensed this private utility to
have a statewide monopoly, and she further noted that since the utility company had failed to provide any notice or hearing regarding
the termination of her utilities, her rights to due process had been
abused.21 The Supreme Court used the Public Function test to limit
such an extension of state action upon licensed monopolies when it
stated that only activities that were traditionally reserved to state authority (e.g., education, fire and police protection, tax collection,
etc.) fall within the ambit of public function.22

2. The Nexus test
Under this test, the Supreme Court measures the quantity and
quality of a governmental entity’s encouragement, coercion, and direction aimed at a private entity.23 For example, in Shelley v.
Kraemer,24 state courts held enforceable the restrictive covenants that
prevented minority Blacks from owning certain homes.25 The Supreme Court later rejected this reasoning and held that the state
courts had, in effect, encouraged or directed racial discrimination26
and thereby violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause.27 As this Note contemplates, the Court has recently been in18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 6, at 764.
419 U.S. 345 (1974).
See id. at 347.
See id. at 347–48.
See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 163–64 (1978).
See Pierguidi, supra note 11, at 460–61.
334 U.S. 1 (1948).
See id. at 4–8.
See id. at 19–20.
See id. at 23; ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 6, at 785–86; see also Pierguidi,
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creasingly unwilling to find the requisite nexus between state entities
and private entities.28

3. The Mutual Contacts or “catch-all” tests
Under this type of analysis, the Court basically examines the
number and type of relationships between the state and the alleged
wrongdoer.29 Specifically, the Court, on a case-by-case basis, weighs
such items as (1) state licensing and regulation of the private entity;
(2) state subsidies or aid to the private entity; (3) the amount of
“symbiosis” or “entanglement” between the state and the private entity; and (4) the amount of “joint action” attributable to the state
and the private entity.30
Perhaps the best example of applying these “catch-all” tests occurs in the Blum Trilogy31 itself and its wake of subsequent cases. In
the next section, this Note will examine the Blum Trilogy cases one
at a time; therefore, the reader may more appropriately note the application of this Mutual Contacts or “catch-all” test momentarily.
Suffice it here to say that Blum essentially established a high-water
mark under this third test (and arguably under the second or Nexus
test). It is this high-water mark that undoubtedly paved the way for
the Brentwood court to stray from the unanimity32 of state supreme
court and federal circuit court decisions which held that state high
school athletic associations were state actors; and which, until
Brentwood, uniformly triggered all of the implications and ramifications of the Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983 onto state interscholastic athletics programs.

supra note 11, at 461.
28. See Pierguidi, supra note 11, at 461–62; see also infra Part V.A (discussing the significance of the Blum Trilogy and its aftermath).
29. See 2 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 6, at 796.
30. See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text.
31. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457
U.S. 922 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982). These cases have become collectively known as the Blum Trilogy. See infra Part II.B.1–3 for a more in-depth analysis of the
Blum Trilogy cases.
32. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 180 F.3d 758 (6th
Cir. 1999), reh’g denied, 190 F.3d 705, 706 (6th Cir. 1999).
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B. THE BLUM TRILOGY

To understand the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in Brentwood, it is
useful to consider the analysis followed in the Blum Trilogy, upon
which the Brentwood Court relied heavily. The Blum Trilogy itself
does not directly address state athletic association issues. This trilogy,
however, is essentially the Supreme Court’s latest word on state action law. As will be ultimately evident, the Blum Trilogy, when examined on a general level of abstraction, stands for the proposition
that the Supreme Court is increasingly reluctant to find “state action” even though the Court may have more easily done so under its
previous tests.

1. Blum
In Blum v. Yaretsky,33 a class of Medicaid patients in private New
York nursing homes challenged whether they could be “demoted”
from skilled care to standard care facilities without any form of due
process or hearing.34 The Supreme Court considered the issue of
whether the state of New York may be held responsible for the decision to “demote” or downgrade the status of these patients’ care.35
Despite the extensive regulatory overlap between decision-making
physicians and New York’s bureaucratic implementation of Medicaid,36 and despite the fact that the state subsidized more than 90%
of the care of the Medicaid patients in these care facilities,37 the
Court held that these nursing homes were not acting under the influence of the state, and therefore were not state actors.38
33. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
34. See id. at 993.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 1004.
37. See id. at 1011.
38. See id. at 1012. The Court’s majority arrived at this conclusion because “demoting”
the Medicaid patients’ standard of care “ultimately turn[ed] on medical judgments made by
private parties according to professional standards that are not established by the State.” Id. at
1008. The dissenting opinion determined, however, that in this case the physician’s role is far
from independent and is, in fact, relegated to simply that of a “scorer,” tabulating the necessary care according to predetermined standards established by the state. See id. at 1022–23
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan further added that these predetermined state standards that expeditiously “demote” Medicaid patients’ level of care are, indeed, less about what
the majority terms professional “decisionmaking” and more about the state’s desire to save
money. See id. at 1014–15. In Blum, therefore, the dissent not only conceptually notes that
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2. Rendell-Baker
In Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,39 Kohn, the director at a private
school for troubled youth, fired one vocational counselor and five
teachers when these faculty members supported a joint student-staff
proposal for changes at the school.40 Ms. Rendell-Baker (and the
others) alleged that they had been dismissed without due process because she had simply exercised her First Amendment speech rights.41
Of course, at issue in this case was whether a private school, which
derives most of its income from the public and which is regulated by
the public, is a state actor when it discharges its employees.42
Basically following the same three tests outlined above,43 the
Court first rejected state actor status under the Public Function test
because education is not an exclusive prerogative of the state where
private schools have often fulfilled this public need.44
Moving directly to the Mutual Contacts or “catch-all” test, this
Court’s same Blum majority held that significant subsidies and heavy
regulation are not enough to confer state actor status. Just as the
nursing home in Blum received significant state subsidies,45 Kohn’s
school received 90 to 99% of its funds from the state.46 Not only did
the Court dismiss this potential “entanglement,” the Rendell-Baker
Court’s majority clearly limited the Mutual Contacts test when it declared that just because a private entity depends on state contracts to
build roads, dams, ships, etc. for the government does not make that
private entity a state actor.47
Justice Marshall, in dissent, took issue with this limitation of the
Mutual Contacts approach and volleyed back that this school, unlike

form has been elevated over substance, but concretely advances the argument that state forms
themselves have been elevated over the substance of what is materially going on in these nursing homes.
39. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
40. See id. at 831.
41. See id. at 834.
42. See id. at 831.
43. See supra Part II.A.1–3.
44. See Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842.
45. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
46. See Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840–41.
47. See id.
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the majority’s state-contracted construction work, is much more
closely regulated and, furthermore, that this school is performing a
statutory duty of the state.48 Justice Marshall conceded that under
this Mutual Contacts test, perhaps the subsidy money and heavy
regulatory schemes in and of themselves may not be enough, but
taken together with several other indicia of state action in the same
factual circumstances,49 the case merits more than mere lip service to
the Mutual Contacts test. In sum, Marshall stated that the majority’s
decision appeared to signal “a return to empty formalism in state action doctrine.”50

3. Lugar
In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil,51 Edmondson Oil, to recover on a
debt, sought a prejudgment attachment against Lugar. The clerk
subsequently issued the writ of attachment, which the county sheriff
executed.52 Lugar sued under § 1983 because Edmondson “had
acted jointly with the state [the court and its officers] to deprive him
of his property without due process of law.”53 The Supreme Court
held that this joint action caused the county court to be a state actor.54 Considering the narrowness of this decision’s applicable holding (i.e., exclusive to prejudgment attachments), not even this case’s
outcome—that the Court’s majority actually found state action
where a private actor had acted55—really appears relevant for evaluating many subsequent state action cases.

C. Status Quo of the Federal Circuits Prior to Brentwood
After the Sixth Circuit held that the TSSAA is not a state actor
and subsequently denied rehearing, Justice Merritt of that circuit
understandably lamented that what had been crystal clear in the law
48. See id. at 851 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
49. See id. at 848 n.1.
50. See id. at 852.
51. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
52. See id. at 924–25.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 941–42.
55. See id. In sum, under a “joint participation” element of the Mutual Contacts test,
the Court held that when the County Clerk and Sheriff acted on Edmondson Oil’s prejudgment attachment, the state acted “jointly” with a private person to take away Lugar’s property
without due process of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See id.

1321

16DREW.DOC

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1/3/02 2:50 PM

[2001

was now clouded.56 Specifically, Merritt did not understand how his
court could reasonably deny a petition for an en banc rehearing
when he considered that each and every circuit that had ever inquired as to whether state high school interscholastic athletic associations were state actors had, in fact, held that they were. And what
troubled him most about his fellow justices’ denial of rehearing was
that they had “created an unnecessary conflict in the circuits on an
important question of constitutional law . . . [which] will have to be
remedied now by the Supreme Court.”57
Prior to the Sixth Circuit’s Brentwood decision, all other federal
circuits consistently held that high school interscholastic athletic associations were state actors.58 The following is a sampling of how
some of these circuits reached their respective conclusions that state
athletic associations are indeed state actors. For the most part, these
circuit cases stand for the proposition that holding state interscholastic athletic associations as state actors was essentially a foregone conclusion. No circuit seriously entertained the possibility that these associations were anything but state actors.

1. Foregone conclusion analysis among the circuits
In the Seventh Circuit’s Griffin High School v. Illinois High
School Ass’n,59 Griffin, a private religious school, sued the state athletic association under § 1983, alleging the Illinois High School Association (“IHSA”) “discriminated against private schools in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.”60 Griffin based its contention upon a

56. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, reh’g en banc denied,
190 F.3d 705, 706–07 (6th Cir. 1999) (Merritt, J., dissenting). In particular, Merritt asserted
that the Sixth Circuit was essentially acting irresponsibly because this circuit’s holding (1) contradicted uniform case law; (2) contradicted the clearly established constitutional theory of
“state action” held in all other circuits and all state supreme courts; and (3) trounced (potentially) the expectations of how almost all fifty states should conduct their high school interscholastic athletic associations. Id. at 706.
57. Id. at 707–08 (Merritt, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court has since granted certiorari. See 120 S. Ct. 1156 (2000).
58. See, e.g., Griffin High Sch. v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 822 F.2d 671, 674 (7th Cir.
1987); In re United States ex rel. Mo. State High Sch. Activities Ass’n, 682 F.2d 147, 151
(8th Cir. 1982); Moreland v. W. Pa. Interscholastic Athletic League, 572 F.2d 121, 125 (3d
Cir. 1978); Okla. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Bray, 321 F.2d 269, 273 (10th Cir. 1963).
59. 822 F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1987).
60. Id. at 672–73.
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new student transfer rule, which enabled high school athletes to
transfer from private schools to public schools with impunity, but
which compelled athletes that transferred from public schools to private schools to sit out one whole year before being eligible to play.61
The court upheld the transfer rule under its rational basis test.62 Of
course, for this court to reach its rational basis analysis, it first entertained the pertinent issue of whether the IHSA was a state actor.63
Apparently both parties conceded this issue because neither party
disputed whether IHSA was a state actor,64 and the court essentially,
like so much of its prior precedent, “assum[ed] without deciding the
question, that the IHSA [was] an arm of the state for Fourteenth
Amendment purposes” because “the overwhelming public nature of
the IHSA membership [was] sufficient to confer state action . . . .”65
The Eighth Circuit’s case of In re United States ex rel. Missouri
State High School Activities Ass’n66 is another high school athlete
transfer rule case.67 Furthermore, just as the Seventh Circuit held
IHSA a state actor, this court simply held that the Missouri State
High School Activities Association (“MSHSAA”) was a state actor
“[b]ecause MSHSAA [was] an association comprised primarily of
public schools, its rules [were] state action governed by the
[F]ourteenth [A]mendment.”68

2. A hint of change
By the early 1990s, one circuit hinted at a potential shift. The
Fifth Circuit’s case of Habetz v. Louisiana High School Athletic

61. See id.
62. See id. at 675. A discussion of such would be beyond the scope of this Note.
63. See id. at 674.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. 682 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1982).
67. See id. at 149–50.
68. Id. at 151. The Tenth Circuit’s Oklahoma High School Athletic Ass’n v. Bray, 321
F.2d 269 (10th Cir. 1963), is yet another high school athlete transfer rule case that required
the Tenth Circuit court to determine whether the Oklahoma High School Athletic Association
(“OHSAA”) was a state actor for purposes of Bray’s § 1983 suit. See id. at 273. Although the
court conceded that the OHSAA is a voluntary association, created by contract of its composite schools rather than legislation, its rules still “ring with authority and are enforced as against
an individual in the name of the public interest, under color of the laws of the State of Oklahoma . . . .” Id.
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Ass’n69 probably provides the best hint of a bridge between the federal circuits’ past practice of consistently holding that state high
school athletic associations were state actors and the Sixth Circuit’s
current break from the pack with Brentwood. In Habetz, a female
high school student desired to play on the baseball team, but she was
forbidden due to a Louisiana High School Athletic Association
(“LHSAA”) rule, which prevented girls from playing on boys’
teams.70 Actually, only attorney’s fees were at issue in this case71 because the girl’s claim became moot when the LHSSA amended its
rule, thereby allowing “a girl to participate in boys sports if the particular school does not offer a comparable girls sport [e.g., If no
girl’s softball is offered, then girls may play baseball].”72 Since the
plaintiff’s case-in-chief—which consisted of § 1983 and Fourteenth
Amendment claims—was no longer at issue, the court did not need
to decide whether the LHSSA was a state actor. The court, however,
noted that the district court had determined that the LHSAA was
not a “state actor” when it applied the Blum Trilogy’s “fairly attributable” theory.73 The court foreshadowed the Brentwood court’s
problematic dealing with Tarkanian74 footnote 13 when it declared,
“[w]hether St. Augustine75 remains controlling in this circuit after
[the Blum Trilogy], and Tarkanian and its footnote 13 is a question
we need not decide.”76 After hinting at a potential gap in recent state
actor precedent, the Fifth Circuit dodged this one. But ten years
later, the Sixth Circuit picked up where the Fifth Circuit left off and
blazed into uncharted state actor jurisprudence.
III. BRENTWOOD ACADEMY
Because the Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Association
(“TSSAA”) has a recruiting rule that prohibits TSSAA member
schools from “[t]he use of undue influence . . . to secure or retain a
69. 915 F.2d 164 (5th Cir. 1990).
70. See id. at 165. Of course, mixed doubles in tennis was excepted. Id.
71. See id. at 167.
72. Id. at 165.
73. See id. at 166–67.
74. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988); see infra Part IV.B.
75. La. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. St. Augustine High Sch., 396 F.2d 224 (5th Cir.
1968) (holding that LHSAA was a state actor). This case was arguably cited as persuasive
precedent by the Supreme Court in Tarkanian’s footnote 13. See infra Part IV.B.3.a.
76. Habetz, 915 F.2d at 167.
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student for athletic purposes,”77 Brentwood Academy alleged
(among other claims) that the TSSAA had violated its First Amendment78 right to free speech as incorporated upon the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment.79 Before the court, therefore, could address
the merits of Brentwood’s claims, the court had to first determine
the issue of whether the TSSAA was a state actor.80

A. The Events Leading up to the Lawsuit
Brentwood Academy is a private Christian school located in
Brentwood, Tennessee.81 Brentwood is considered to be what is
commonly regarded as a high school “football powerhouse.”82
Brentwood has been nationally ranked by USA Today, it has compiled a 310-43 record over the past twenty-eight years (as of March
1998), and it has racked up seven state championship titles.83
The other party to this action, the TSSAA, was incorporated in
1925 as a voluntary association84 to oversee interscholastic athletic
programs in Tennessee’s secondary schools. By the late 1990’s, 290
public schools and fifty-five private schools comprised TSSAA’s
membership.85
In 1997, various rival coaches, apparently tired of both losing
and of the bitterness of sour grapes, alleged that Brentwood had violated some TSSAA rules.86 TSSAA investigated and found (among
other infractions) that the Brentwood football coach had sent a letter
to already-accepted, incoming ninth graders to join the team’s spring
practice while in the eighth grade.87 According to TSSAA, this action

77. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 180 F.3d 758, 761
(6th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 1156 (2000), rev’d, No. 99-901, 2001 U.S. LEXIS
964 (Feb. 20, 2001) (citing TSSAA Bylaws, art. II, § 21).
78. The First Amendment provides, in pertinent part: “Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
79. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
80. Brentwood, 180 F.3d at 760.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 762.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 760.
87. See id. at 760–61. The TSSAA also found that the Brentwood football coach had
provided free tickets to a Brentwood football game for a middle school coach and two middle
school athletes. TSSAA’s penalty for this violation of the “recruiting rule” was not a contested
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itself violated the TSSAA’s “recruiting rule” which states:
The use of undue influence on a student (with or without an athletic record), his or her parents or guardians of a student by any
person, connected or not connected, with the school to secure or
retain a student for athletic purposes shall be a violation of the recruiting rule.88

By August of 1997, TSSAA declared (1) that Brentwood, as a result of violating these rules, would be ineligible to participate in
TSSAA football and basketball tournaments for one year, and (2)
that all Brentwood programs would be on probation for two years.89
Naturally, Brentwood appealed this decision as part of TSSAA’s internal appeals process. But, by the end of Brentwood’s second appeal, TSSAA actually increased Brentwood’s penalties. TSSAA declared (1) that Brentwood would be ineligible to participate in
tournaments for two years, (2) that all Brentwood programs would
be on probation for four years, and (3) that Brentwood would pay a
fine of $3000.90
At this juncture, a critical point must be clarified. Under its “recruiting rule,” TSSAA is not punishing Brentwood Academy for
holding a football spring practice (which it could do under the
TSSAA rules), but rather punishing the program because the football
coach contacted the already admitted, incoming freshman to let
them know just when that legitimate spring practice program would
begin. As the district court found, Brentwood’s true violation lay in
Brentwood Academy’s football coach’s, or rather Coach Flatt’s invitation91 to attend the football practice, not in the practice itself. Fur-

issue in Brentwood’s future state action lawsuit. The TSSAA further found that the basketball
coach had impermissibly held an off-season practice. However, because that coach had violated
the “off-season practice rule” rather than the “recruiting rule,” it did not implicate any First
Amendment free speech rights, which Brentwood attempted to vindicate with its lawsuit
against the TSSAA. Id.
88. Id. at 761 (citing TSSAA Bylaws, art. II, § 21).
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. The full text of the invitation reads:
Having officially enrolled at Brentwood Academy, the TSSAA allows you to participate in spring football practice. If you are not currently involved in a sport at your
school, we would like to invite you to practice with your new team. Equipment will
be given out April 30th at 3:30 downstairs in the locker room.
Spring practice will begin May 1, 1997 and conclude on May 14, 1997. Practice begins at 3:30 and will be finished by 4:45. Due to the inconvenience to your parents,
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thermore, Coach Flatt’s subsequent telephone calls to students,
which were prompted by a parent’s concerned inquiry about what to
do if his child’s middle school activity conflicted with Brentwood’s
spring football practice, further violated the “recruiting rule” even
though the substance of Coach Flatt’s telephone message actually
discouraged the boys from attending practice if it in any way conflicted with activities at their respective middle schools.92

B. Brentwood Files Suit
On December 12, 1997, Brentwood, after exhausting the
TSSAA’s appeals process, filed suit against TSSAA.93 Brentwood
sought injunctive relief against enforcement of the TSSAA’s “recruiting rule” primarily because it allegedly violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983.94
Brentwood’s § 1983 claim charged that TSSAA’s “recruiting rule”
deprived Brentwood of its First and Fourteenth Amendment rights
under color of state law95 because the TSSAA, as an alleged state actor, prohibited Brentwood’s football coach from communicating to
Brentwood’s incoming freshman and punished the program for
sending a letter to and telephoning these incoming freshman. The
United States District Court granted summary judgment to Brentwood when it held that the TSSAA’s “recruiting rule,” on its face,
violated the First Amendment.96 TSSAA, arguing that it was not a
state actor for purposes of § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment,
brought this appeal to the Sixth Circuit.97

please do not feel that you must attend every practice. However, I do feel that getting involved as soon as possible would definitely be to your advantage.
In the near future, you will receive a letter outlining our summer workout program.
If you have any questions, please call me at school 373-0611 x 119, or at home
373-0475. We are certainly glad that you decided to become an Eagle.
Your Coach,
/s/ Carlton Flatt
Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 13 F. Supp. 2d 670, 676 (M.D.
Tenn. 1998), rev’d, 180 F.3d 758 (6th Cir. 1999), rev’d, No. 99-901, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 964
(Feb. 20, 2001).
92. Id. at 676. Coach Flatt chose to individually “telephone the students because there
was not enough time before the start of spring practice to send another letter.” Id.
93. See Brentwood, 180 F.3d at 761.
94. See id. See supra note 5 for pertinent text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
95. See Brentwood, 180 F.3d at 761.
96. See Brentwood, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 695.
97. See Brentwood, 180 F.3d at 761.
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C. TSSAA Appeals
Maintaining the district court’s holding of state action, therefore,
was critical to Brentwood Academy in TSSAA’s appeal to the Sixth
Circuit because the Fourteenth and First Amendments and “§1983
erect[] no shield against merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful.”98 In other words, “[t]o prevail on a First
Amendment claim, [Brentwood] must first make a showing that
[TSSAA] is a ‘state actor.’”99
In order to determine whether TSSAA is a “state actor,” the
Sixth Circuit must first analyze the TSSAA itself before looking to
binding and precedential rules of law. The Sixth Circuit essentially
found the following seven core factors regarding TSSAA’s characteristics to aid in its determination of whether TSSAA was a state actor:
(1) TSSAA was founded in 1925 as a voluntary association; (2)
TSSAA was composed of 290 public and 55 private schools; (3)
TSSAA’s administrative authority consisted of nine elected Board of
Control members (elected by member schools) who are either school
principals or superintendents, and at all times relevant to this case,
these nine elected board members all came from public schools; (4)
TSSAA received no state funding, rather all of its revenues came
from tournament gate receipts; (5) TSSAA scheduled only tournaments and not the state’s majority of athletic contests, and in fact,
when the TSSAA scheduled tournaments at public (e.g. school) facilities, TSSAA entered into a paying contract with the state to do so;
(6) nothing in the Tennessee Code authorized the state to conduct
interscholastic events or empowered the TSSAA to do so;100 and finally (7) membership in TSSAA was voluntary.101
The sixth factor listed above—the Tennessee State Board of
Education’s 1972 “designation” to conduct interscholastic events—
received greater attention in the district court than in the Sixth Circuit’s review. This is consistent with that district court’s approach of
weighing substance and with the Sixth Circuit’s approach of weighing form. To illustrate, the district court found it significant that in

98. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).
99. See Brentwood, 180 F.3d at 761–62.
100. In spite of the seeming lack of authority, the Tennessee State Board of Education
“designated” TSSAA to conduct interscholastic events from 1972 until 1995, when this “designation” was repealed. See id.
101. See id. at 762.
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1972, the Tennessee State Board of Education, clearly a “state actor,” designated TSSAA as “the organization to supervise and regulate the athletic activities in which the public junior and senior high
schools of Tennessee participate on an interscholastic basis.”102 The
district court, furthermore, deemed it significant that from 1972 until 1993, the Tennessee State Board of Education, itself, reviewed
and approved TSSAA rules on several occasions and even found opportunity to review the “recruiting rule.”103 Finally, the district court
noted that the 1995 Tennessee State Board of Education suspiciously repealed its “designation” of TSSAA as the organization
regulating interscholastic athletics in the wake of Tennessee lawsuits
continually holding that the TSSAA is a state actor.104 Again, the district court noted that after 1995, the forms regarding the relationship between the Tennessee State Board of Education had changed,
but the district court accepted as material fact that the underlying
substantive relationship remained the same.105 Of significant note,
the Sixth Circuit did not address this issue in its de novo review.
IV. BRENTWOOD ANALYSIS—BLUM TRILOGY FRAMEWORK IN
ACTION
After evaluating the facts, procedural history, and standard of review, the Sixth Circuit’s Brentwood court concluded that the TSSAA
was clearly not a direct arm of the state and, therefore, plunged directly into Blum Trilogy application of the three general tests outlined above.106 The circuit court apparently determined that the
Blum Trilogy lens would shed more light on these general “state actor” tests than its own, other circuits’, or even state supreme courts’
unanimous holdings that secondary school interscholastic athletic associations, such as the TSSAA, are state actors for purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983 analysis.

102. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 13 F. Supp. 2d 670, 675
(M.D. Tenn. 1998) (citing Tenn. Bd. of Educ. Rule 0520-1-2.26 (later moved to Rule 05201-2.08)).
103. See id.
104. See id. at 675, 681–82. See generally Crocker v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic
Ass’n, 735 F. Supp. 753 (M.D. Tenn. 1990), aff’d, 908 F.2d 972 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding the
TSSAA to be a “state actor”); Graham v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, No. 1:95-CV044, 1995 WL 115890 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 20, 1995) (same).
105. See Brentwood, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 681–82.
106. See supra Part II.A.
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A. Analysis of the Sixth Circuit’s Application of the State Action
Tests
As noted, the Sixth Circuit recognized the three general state action tests. The court, however, used different labels than the author
has chosen.107 From its prior precedents, the court recognized (1)
the Public Function test; (2) the Nexus [or state compulsion/coercion] test; and (3) the Mutual Contacts “catch-all” [or
Symbiotic] test .108

1. The Public Function test
Under its conceptualization of the Public Function test, the
court sought to determine whether “the private entity [TSSAA] exercised power which was traditionally exclusively reserved to the
state, such as holding elections, or eminent domain.”109 In quick
fashion, the court concluded that “neither the conduct nor the coordination of amateur sports ha[d] been a traditional government
function.”110

2. The Nexus test
Next, the court delved into the Nexus [or state compulsion/coercion] test. Under this test, the court required that a party,
such as Brentwood Academy, must “prove that the state has so coerced or encouraged a private entity to act that the choice of that entity [TSSAA] must be regarded as the choice of the state.”111 When
applying this test to the facts of Brentwood, the court unequivocally
stated in abrupt conclusory fashion, “the state of Tennessee’s interaction with TSSAA has been minimal,”112 even in light of the State
Board of Education’s decision to no longer “designate” the TSSAA

107. the author chose to use labels noted in the main text rather than the bracketed labels
the Sixth Circuit employs not to confuse the reader, but to be more consistent with the Supreme Court and leading scholars.
108. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 180 F.3d 758, 763 (6th
Cir. 1995); see also Wolotsky v. Huhn, 960 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir. 1992).
109. Brentwood, 180 F.3d at 763 (quoting Wolotsky, 960 F.2d at 1335).
110. Id. at 763 (quoting S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm.,
483 U.S. 522, 545 (1987) (first alteration in the original)).
111. Id. (citing Wolotsky, 960 F.2d at 1335).
112. Id.
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to conduct interscholastic activities.113As noted above,114 this conclusion flies in the face of the lower court’s conclusion that Tennessee
and TSSAA have had significant interaction because, as a matter of
undisputed fact, the Board of Education had reviewed and approved
TSSAA rules.115 The lower court, in its view, characterized this recent
Board of Education’s repeal of the TSSAA’s “designation” status as a
reduction as to form, but not in substance.116 Subsequently, this difference in characterization led the lower court to hold that TSSAA
even violated the Nexus test and not just the “catch-all” test;117
whereas, the overturning circuit held that it had not.118
Not only did the circuit court in Brentwood downplay the factual record, but it also analogized TSSAA’s athletic situation to that
of a heavily regulated utility monopoly in Pennsylvania.119 Here, the
court blatantly invoked an “apples and oranges” analogy. This is
problematic because, first of all, the Metropolitan Edison120 case was
fought on Public Function test grounds, which this court rightly determined as inapplicable to the situation in Brentwood. Therefore,
the court mixed inapplicable Public Function analysis with Nexus
analysis. Secondly, the court disregarded the fact that Metropolitan
Edison involved a monopoly experimentally engaging in public utility services while Brentwood involved a monopoly engaging schools,
which are obligated to fulfill their state’s statutorily educational duties.

113. See id.
114. See supra Part III.C.
115. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 13 F. Supp. 2d 670,
681 (M.D. Tenn. 1998).
116. See id. (finding that the conduct of the Tennessee State Board of Education and
TSSAA had not materially changed simply because the Board had reacted by “fixing” its “delegation” language in the face of two recent district court cases that had also held the TSSAA to
be a “state actor”); see also Pierguidi, supra note 11, at 470. See generally Crocker v. Tenn.
Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 735 F. Supp. 753 (M.D. Tenn. 1990); Graham v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, No. 1:95-CV-044, 1995 WL 115890 (E.D. Tenn. 1995) (referring to the two recent district court cases that held the TSSAA to be a “state actor”).
117. See Brentwood, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 685.
118. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 180 F.3d 758, 764
(6th Cir. 1995).
119. See id.; Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); supra Part II.A.1.
120. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).

1331

16DREW.DOC

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

1/3/02 2:50 PM

[2001

3. Mutual Contacts or “catch-all” test
The Mutual Contacts “catch-all” [or Symbiotic] test, presents
some challenges for the Sixth Circuit, especially in light of the Sixth
Circuit’s cases which hold that these interscholastic athletic associations are state actors. The court, however, avoided these “controlling” precedent cases, which held interscholastic athletic associations
as state actors, by relegating these cases to the status of dicta.121 In its
analysis, the court essentially sidestepped the Mutual Contacts
“catch-all” [Symbiotic] test when, rather than using this test’s catchall catch phrases such as state aid, state subsidies, regulation, entanglement, etc., the court simply restated the higher standard of the
Nexus test’s language. Specifically, the court stated that to find state
action, an athletic association such as TSSAA must be “controlled or
directed by the state or its agencies. This, Brentwood has failed to do
in the present case.”122 Controlling or directing actions are not standards under the Mutual Contacts test, but rather under the Nexus or
coercion test.123 At least the Supreme Court’s dismissive analysis of
the Mutual Contacts “catch-all” test in its Blum Trilogy remained
true to that test’s traditional standard. Ultimately, after dodging its
“controlling” state athletic association precedents and “applying” the
three traditional state action tests, the Brentwood court was finally
ready to address the Supreme Court’s only direct hint at how it
would treat state athletic associations—Tarkanian’s hint in footnote
13.

121. See Brentwood, 180 F.3d at 764–66 (distinguishing as mere dicta the prior state
athletic association holdings of Burrows v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 891 F.2d 122, 125
(6th Cir. 1989); Alerding v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 779 F.2d 315, 316 n.1 (6th Cir.
1985); Yellow Springs Exempted Vill. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic
Ass’n, 647 F.2d 651, 653 (6th Cir. 1981)).
122. Brentwood, 180 F.3d at 764. Of worthy note, it would be quite oversimplistic to
characterize the Sixth Circuit’s reversing the lower court’s holding that TSSAA is a “state actor” because the lower court failed to apply the Blum test. Significantly, the Sixth Circuit’s reversal appears to turn on its application of Blum to more selective factors; whereas the lower
court listed a plethora of factors showing the entwined nature of the state and TSSAA and noting that “[c]ertainly the conduct of the TSSAA and the State meet the ‘significant encouragement’ and ‘fairly attributable’ [or, Nexus] tests of Blum.” Brentwood, 13 F. Supp. 2d at 685.
123. See supra Part II.A.2–3.
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B. Testing the Circuit’s Broad Dicta Brush of Tarkanian Footnote
13
In its last few sentences of analysis, the Brentwood court dismissed the Supreme Court’s statement in NCAA v. Tarkanian124 that
a high school athletic association might be a state actor as pure dicta.

1. The footnote’s background
In Tarkanian, Coach Tarkanian initially sued his employer—
University of Nevada Las Vegas (“UNLV”)—for firing him in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when UNLV, at the NCAA’s behest, deprived him of his coaching position (or, in other words, deprived
him of his property and liberty rights) without due process of law.125
The NCAA became initially involved in this case’s circumstances after it found recruiting violations in Coach Tarkanian’s program.126
Subsequently, the NCAA was joined as a necessary party to Tarkanian’s suit because the NCAA placed “constraints” on UNLV to
clean up the Tarkanian program by clearing out Tarkanian himself.127
Ultimately, a divided 5-4 United States Supreme Court reversed the
Nevada Supreme Court’s holding that the NCAA was a state actor.128 More specifically, the Supreme Court held that the NCAA’s
source institutions (public and private), which make and enforce its
rules, do not act under color of Nevada state law. Rather the
NCAA’s “collective membership[] speak[s] through an organization
that is independent of any particular state.”129

2. Controversial text of footnote 13 itself
Specifically, the Supreme Court’s majority qualified the last sentence in the preceding paragraph by adding in a footnote that:
124. 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
125. See id. at 187–90.
126. See id. at 184–87.
127. See id. at 186.
128. See id. at 199.
129. Id. at 193. Of course, on the other side of the Supreme Court’s narrow majority,
the dissenters (and the Nevada Supreme Court) determined that UNLV’s adherence to NCAA
rules and recommendations converted the NCAA into a state actor under a “jointly engaged”
theory of either the Nexus or Mutual Contacts test. See id. Factually, however, the Majority
claimed the upper hand on this so-called “jointly engaged” theory because, in reality, the
NCAA and UNLV were at odds throughout this entire ordeal since UNLV wanted to keep
Tarkanian, but the NCAA wanted him out. See id. at 196.
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[t]he situation would, of course, be different if the membership
consisted entirely of institutions located within the same State,
many of them public institutions created by the same sovereign.
See Clark v. Arizona Interscholastic Association, 695 F.2d 1126
(CA9 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818 (1983); Louisiana High
School Athletic Association v. St. Augustine High School, 396
F.2d 224 (CA5 1968). The dissent apparently agrees that the
NCAA was not acting under color of state law in its relationships
with private universities, which constitute the bulk of its membership. See post, at 202, n. 2.130

3. Two sentences at issue
Footnote 13 may appropriately be best understood when it is
broken into its two composite parts—sentence one with a supporting
string cite and sentence two with a supporting reference to the dissent’s opinion.
a. Sentence one. As will be discussed later,131 the Brentwood
court ignored the import of the relevant first sentence, which addresses the intrastate-association membership question. The court
only narrowly addressed the irrelevant second sentence, which, in the
interests of shorthand may be deemed the private-institution-asmajority/joint action question. Notably, the court also chose to ignore the import of the two supporting, favorably cited circuit court
decisions which clearly held that state interscholastic athletic associations are state actors.
For example, in the Supreme Court’s favorably cited case of Louisiana High School Athletic Ass’n (“LHSAA”) v. St. Augustine High
130. Id. at 193 n.13 (1988). The dissent’s footnote 2 is as follows:
The Court notes that the United States Courts of Appeals have, since our decisions
in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982), Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457
U.S. 922 (1982), and Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) [the Blum Trilogy],
held unanimously that the NCAA is not a state actor. Ante, at 182 n.5. See McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1346 (CA5 1988); Karmanos v. Baker, 816 F.2d
258, 261 (CA6 1987); Graham v. NCAA, 804 F.2d 953, 958 (CA6 1986); Arlosoroff v. NCAA, 746 F.2d 1019, 1021–1022 (CA4 1984). In none of those cases,
however, did the courts address the theory before us here. E.g., McCormack, supra,
at 1346. Indeed, in Arlosoroff, on which the subsequent decisions principally rely,
the plaintiff was challenging the actions of Duke, a private university. The issue of
joint action between the NCAA and a public university would never have arisen in
that case.
Id. at 202 n.2 (White, J., dissenting).
131. See infra Part IV.B.4.
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School,132 St. Augustine, a private school comprised of black students
sought to enjoin LHSAA’s practice of maintaining a “White” and
“Negro” system of interscholastic athletic competition.133 The Fifth
Circuit held that it had no substantial doubt that LHSAA actions are
state actions because (1) 85% of LHSAA’s member schools are public schools; (2) LHSAA received money from gate receipts; and (3)
LHSAA’s events are held in state facilities, etc.134
Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit anticipated the argument that
state athletic associations such as LHSAA do not impact private
schools such as St. Augustine (or, by logical extension, to Brentwood
Academy). Specifically, this court stated that St. Augustine’s status as
a private school was immaterial because LHSAA elected to allow private schools to participate in state activity, and, therefore, LHSAA,
which “become[s] amenable to Fourteenth Amendment requirements[,]” must extend commensurate benefits consistent with constitutional standards to private schools.135
Finally, with the St. Augustine court perhaps anticipating the desire for courts to succumb to the temptation to conservatively apply
form over substance in this area of state actor jurisprudence, the
court added that “for the state [of Louisiana] to devote so much
time, energy, and other resources to interscholastic athletics and then
to refer coordination of those activities to a separate body cannot obscure the real and pervasive involvement of the state in the total program.”136
b. Sentence two. Rather than address that pertinent first sentence, the Brentwood court, notably, zeroed in on the second sentence of Tarkanian’s footnote 13.137 From the language of sentence
two, the court seems to deem it significant “that even if an athletic
association is a state actor when dealing with a public school, it ‘was
not acting under color of state law in its relationships with private
universities.’”138 As noted above, the Fifth Circuit, in its late 1960’s

132. 396 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1968).
133. See id. at 225.
134. See id. at 227.
135. Id. at 229.
136. Id. at 228 (quoting St. Augustine High Sch. v. La. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 270 F.
Supp. 767, 773 (E.D. La. 1967)) (emphasis added).
137. See supra note 130 and accompanying text; see also infra Part IV.B.4.
138. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 180 F.3d 758, 766 (6th
Cir. 1995) (quoting NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 193 n.13 (1988)).
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St. Augustine case, perceptively anticipated that such public/private
distinctions might come into play in this area of state actor analysis.
The very notion, however, that private school athletes may not have
remedies against the state’s athletic association but that these athletes’ public school competitors may have remedies is incongruous at
best. It makes no sense to make the type of school the dispositive issue. Clearly, the Sixth Circuit has lost focus in state actor analysis
when it scrutinizes only the aggrieved party’s actions rather than the
respective actions of the alleged wrongdoer—specifically in this case,
the actions of the athletic association and the state. As will be evident, there are more problems to Brentwood’s analysis of footnote
13 than this.
4. Controlling yet unpersuasive within its own Sixth Circuit: The
fallout of Brentwood’s treatment of footnote 13
Within a few months after the Brentwood decision, a district
court within the Sixth Circuit determined that Michigan’s high
school athletic association was a state actor. In Communities for Equity (“Equity”) v. Michigan High School Athletic Ass’n
(“MHSAA”),139 a group of female athletes, citing forms of alleged
discrimination, brought a class action against the MHSAA. Naturally, this was a Title IX case, and, therefore, the Equity court’s
analysis focused on whether the MHSAA was a federal fund recipient. (Such analysis is beyond the scope of this Note.) The court,
however, did engage in state actor analysis for Equal Protection and
§ 1983 purposes, which is within the scope of this Note. To determine whether the MHSAA was a state actor, the district court naturally applied the controlling three tests.140 Despite the binding precedent of the Sixth Circuit in Brentwood, this lower district court held
that the MHSAA was a state actor (1) because the MHSSA failed
both the Nexus test141 and the weakened, but still intact, Mutual
Contacts or “catch-all” test;142 (2) because a vast majority of circuit
139. 80 F. Supp. 2d 729 (W.D. Mich. 2000).
140. See id. at 739. See supra Part II.A for a refresher on the three dominant tests applied
to find state action.
141. See id. at 739 (holding that the state coerced or encouraged the MHSAA because
the MHSAA acts at the will of its representative local districts, which are governed primarily by
state employees).
142. See id. at 739–40 (holding that there was a sufficiently close nexus of action between the state and the MHSAA because (1) the MHSAA is made up primarily of public
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courts had so held;143 and (3) because, in its view, Brentwood’s
analysis was irreconcilable with the Supreme Court’s Tarkanian footnote 13.144
To show how irreconcilable the Brentwood court’s treatment of
Tarkanian’s footnote 13 was, the Equity district court explained that:
[t]he Tarkanian case required the Supreme Court to examine two
independent state actor questions. First, the Supreme Court was
required to briefly analyze in what instances an athletic association
might be considered a state actor because its members controlled
the association and those members were state actors. (“The membership question”). Second, the Supreme Court examined in what
instances an athletic association should be considered a state actor
when it engages in joint activity with the state. (“The joint action
question”). With these independent inquiries in mind, Footnote 13
appears to stand for three propositions. First, an athletic association
made up of schools from across the country, the majority of which
are private schools, is not a state actor because no one state controls the policy of the association. Second, if an association were
made up of schools from the same state, and the majority of those
schools were public, the association might well be a state actor.
Third, while “joint action” between a public school and a private
association might render the private association a state actor, joint
action between a private school and a private association would
not.145

Ultimately, the court in Equity factually distinguished the case
before them from the pertinent facts that were presented to the
Brentwood court. Because Brentwood was a private school, rather

schools (617 public and 114 private), (2) public employees oversee the MHSAA, (3) school
employees who serve on the MHSAA Representative Council must have approval from their
principal or superintendent, (4) the Michigan Superintendent of Public Instruction is ex-officio
member of the Representative Council, and (5) the MHSAA influences and controls interscholastic rules and policies).
143. See id. at 742.
144. See id.
145. Id. Less than one month later, in Michigan’s neighboring state of Indiana, the Seventh Circuit’s United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, which, of
course, was not bound by the Sixth Circuit’s Brentwood decision, agreed with the Equity
court’s persuasive characterization of Brentwood’s Tarkanian analysis when it stated that “there
appears to be a serious disconnect between Tarkanian and the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in
Brentwood Academy.” Pearson v. Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, No. IP 99-1857-C-T/G,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11913 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 8, 2000) (citing Communities for Equity v.
Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 80 F. Supp. 2d 729 (W.D. Mich. 2000)).
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than a public school as in Equity, the Sixth Circuit’s holding and
analysis was strictly limited to only the circumstances of “a private
school alleging that a state athletic association is a state actor when it
regulates that private school . . . .”146 The students in Equity, however, attended a public school that was alleging that a state athletic
association is a state actor when it regulates that public (not private)
school.
This factual distinction highlights a dangerous turn in state actor
jurisprudence. Rather than scrutinizing the traditional characteristics
and actions of the alleged private entity/state actor (e.g., the state
athletic association, or in the Blum case, the nursing homes) the
Sixth Circuit’s Tarkanian reliance appears to be embracing a broader
scope of inquiry that unduly focuses on the party complaining of
some wrongdoing (e.g., students and staff at Brentwood Academy,
or by implication in the Blum case, the Medicaid patients). Under
the Brentwood court’s application of Tarkanian footnote 13, we are
presented with the inequitable potentiality that a state athletic association such as TSSAA could discriminate against private school athletes on the basis of race, gender, or religion while these same associations could not so discriminate at public schools. Clearly, the
focus on the type of school attended obscures the real object of inquiry—that of the alleged private entity/state actor.
V. BRENTWOOD GONE AWRY: WHERE STATE ACTION
JURISPRUDENCE FAILS
The most glaring gap in the Sixth Circuit’s analysis lies in the fact
that the opinion never addresses or even gives lip service to all the
other federal circuits that have always come out on the other side of
this issue. Of course, this court is only bound by its own and the Supreme Court’s precedent; however, this court’s unwillingness to even
distinguish its analysis from the other circuits shows a lack of analytical depth. Perhaps its lacking, however, is more appropriately placed
squarely on the shoulders of its play caller—the Supreme Court.

A. The Supreme Court and the Blum Trilogy
Although the Supreme Court appears to apply three tests to determine whether a private entity is state actor, in reality, it only ap-

146. Equity, 80 F. Supp. 2d at 742–43.
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plies two tests. The third test—Mutual Contacts or “catch-all” (or,
in Sixth Circuit vernacular, Symbiotic) test—has no bite. For example, in both Blum and Rendell-Baker147 the Supreme Court continued to outline this test’s factors such as (1) state licensing and regulation of the private entity; (2) state subsidies or aid to the private
entity; and (3) the amount of “symbiosis” or “entanglement” between the state and the private entity. Then the Court’s majority
whittles away the significance of these factors, and, in the end, dismisses any or all of them as inconsequential. Just in Blum, for example, the Court accepted that New York (1) heavily regulated the
nursing care industry; (2) heavily subsidized over 90% of the care in
this industry with its Medicaid program; and (3) generally recognized that there was a heavy dose of symbiosis between the physicians and the state program. However, this was not enough to trigger this third and lowest standard test. When one considers the
Supreme Court’s treatment of this test, it is no wonder the Brentwood court felt compelled to only give lip service to it.
Although the first test (the Public Function test) does not apply
in the Brentwood case, it too has inherent limitations that the Supreme Court has yet to address. First of all, it is so narrow in scope,
it is no wonder that it does not apply to Brentwood: it can rarely apply to anything. When one considers just how narrow the Court has
construed this test (e.g., running elections and police and fire protection), it is no small wonder that the 1940’s New Deal programs and
the 1960’s social welfare programs such as Medicaid do not reach
the Court’s conception of this test. This test, in effect, is frozen in
the traditional government of the nineteenth century, and no matter
how increasingly intrusive the state may, through private entities, act
in our lives, the judiciary has given the state license to do so with its
“frozen” concept of state action. The Public Function test is so frozen in the last century that even each of the fifty state’s statutory
duty to provide each citizen’s constitutionally recognized property
interest in a free and appropriate education is not enough to trigger
this public function test.148
Thus, in short, the Supreme Court is encouraging the Courts of
Appeals to, in practical effect, only apply one test—the Nexus Test.
Worthy of note, however, is just how much this test has effectively
147. See supra Part II.B.1-2.
148. See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982).
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been limited. It takes a government entity’s covert or overt encouragement or coercion aimed at a private entity to trigger the characterization of that targeted private entity as “state actor.”149 Given
how the Supreme Court worked around the Second Circuit’s holding of state action in Blum by re-characterizing the facts underlying
its holding,150 it should come as no surprise that the Sixth Circuit
does the same. As you may recall, the district court, when it held that
the actions of TSSAA constituted state action, found it significant
that the Tennessee State Board of Education still substantially influenced the TSSAA. The Sixth Circuit simply ignored this potentially
condemning fact under this second test, which measures coercion,
encouragement, or even direction. This head-in-the-sand approach
appears to be consistent with the Brentwood court’s modus operandi
at distinguishing itself from all the other persuasive circuits—it just
ignores them.

B. Lack of Predictability
Lack of predictability is another troubling hallmark in state action law. Essentially, because the courts have these three flexible tests
that they shape around the facts on a case-by-case basis, the state action area of the law is quite unpredictable and confusing. To highlight this confusion, consider the United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts’ dilemma in its respective dispositions of
the Blum Trilogy’s Rendell-Baker case.151
Before the terminated vocational teacher’s and the other five
teacher’s respective cases were joined, they were tried as two separate
cases. In the vocational teacher’s case, the district judge granted
summary judgment to the defendant school because he found no
requisitely close nexus between the school and the state.152 On the
other hand, “[n]ine days earlier . . . a different judge of [the same
court] reached a contrary conclusion on the same question in the
case brought by the other five petitioners.”153 This judge denied
summary judgment to the defendant school because its dependency

149. See supra Part II.A.2.
150. See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1005 (1982), for specifics on how the Supreme
Court narrowed the scope of the lower court’s factual findings to avoid finding state action.
151. See supra Part II.B.2 for more background on this case.
152. See Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 835–36.
153. Id. at 836.
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on state funds and state regulation, “although . . . not a uniquely
public function, [] [was] primarily a public function.”154 So, in short,
one judge failed to see how this private vocational school could be
considered a state actor under the lowest test bar, while another
judge, on the same court, held this same school under the very same
factual pattern to be a state actor under the highest test bar. In other
words, predictability, schmadictability.155

C. The Hands-off or Judicial Restraint Approach
In its last few analytical sentences, the Brentwood court permits
an insightful glimpse into just why it, perhaps, has so narrowly (or,
arguably not at all) applied the state action tests to TSSAA in two
words—judicial restraint. Specifically, the court states: “[w]e are not
super referees over high school athletic programs . . . . [even though
such] competition may loom large in the eyes of youths, even parents. . . . these issues are not of constitutional magnitude.”156 The
court goes on to recognize Brentwood Academy’s legitimate concern that vague TSSAA rules (i.e., “undue influence”) may lead to
arbitrary enforcement, but the court states that such concerns should
be resolved among the TSSAA’s compositional membership and not
in the federal courts.157
As a general practice, it may be praiseworthy for the courts to exercise judicial restraint in the area of education. Keeping judicial intervention at a minimum because schools themselves are better
equipped at devising rules158 is, perhaps, a noble stance. Because of
this stance, the Brentwood court basically “remanded” this decision
back to TSSAA when it suggested that TSSAA membership should
resolve this issue.159 Upon “remand,” however, what remedy may
Brentwood Academy realistically expect from TSSAA? Private

154. Id.
155. See infra Part VII.B.2 for additional analysis explaining why the Supreme Court’s
resolution of the Brentwood case will further decrease predictability in state action law.
156. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 180 F.3d 758, 766 (6th
Cir. 1995) (citing Hardy v. Univ. Interscholastic League, 759 F.2d 1233, 1235 (5th Cir.
1985)). See, e.g., Pierguidi, supra note 11, at 493 (noting the significance of the federal judiciary’s hands-off approach in athletics).
157. See Brentwood, 180 F.3d at 766.
158. See In re United States ex rel. Mo. State High Sch. Activities Ass’n, 682 F.2d 147,
153 (8th Cir. 1982).
159. See Brentwood, 180 F.3d at 766.
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schools have little, if any, political influence on TSSAA, especially
since the Board is exclusively comprised of public school administrators.160 If anything, these same public school administrators, who
sought to level the playing field by enforcing the recruiting rule
against the Academy, now have judicial license to arbitrarily or discriminatorily make any rules no matter how egregious or unfair they
may be. Ultimately, TSSAA is a monopolistic entity (like so many of
its sister organizations in Tennessee’s sister states), and if Brentwood
wants to play in interscholastic athletics, it will just have to keep taking TSSAA’s hits, no matter how capricious TSSAA’s rules may be.
Unless, of course, this term’s Supreme Court rules otherwise.161

D. A Possible Solution
Rather than gambling with these state action tests, which more
often than not tend to smack of outcome determinative judgments,
perhaps the courts should adopt one test. At the very least, the
courts should adopt one test that offers judges an opportunity to
show what they are weighing behind their application of these three
limited state action tests. One such approach is a balancing test.162
If judges were to implement a balancing test, they would weigh
two items—rights against practices. If the value of a legitimate right
(e.g., First Amendment, Due Process, etc.) outweighs the value of
the private entity’s challenged practice (e.g., athletic rule making,
Medicaid implementing, etc.) then the practice violates the constitutional amendment at issue, and the state (either covertly or overtly)
is allowing the practice to limit this right when it should not. Conversely, if the value of a right is not clearly greater that the challenged practice’s value, then the practice does not violate the
amendment at issue, and the state is not allowing a practice to continue that it should not.163 As critics of the three-test approach have
noted:
While the balancing has nothing to do with finding a minimum
quantum of state activity, the process of sorting out proscribed ac-

160. See id. at 762.
161. The Supreme Court heard oral arguments on Oct. 11, 2000. See Jeff Lockridge,
Football Started Free Speech Case: Brentwood Academy Case Moves to Supreme Court,
TENNESSEAN, Oct. 8, 2000, at 12W.
162. See 2 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 6, at 819.
163. Id.
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tivities has occurred under the guise of a formulistic search for an
undefined minimum of state acts. In practice, when the challenged
practice deserved state protection the Court has ruled that state action is lacking, declaring in effect that the practice is compatible
with the Fourteenth Amendment. [Ruling the other way,] the
Court has found sufficient state action, which made easy a final ruling of unconstitutionality.164

In other words, when courts desire to protect a right, they bend
the analysis to find state action. And, of course, they bend the analysis the other way to protect a private entity’s state practice. Judges
are informally weighing these rights-versus-practices items while they
contemporaneously “apply” the three traditional tests anyway.
Rather than doing so under the guise of these formulaic tests,
judges, under a balancing approach, would weigh openly what they
are weighing privately. Of course, this approach may not totally
eliminate the lack of predictability problem. Nevertheless, it is a step
in the right direction; over time, practitioners would necessarily get a
sense of just how heavily courts weigh some rights versus others.
Some observers have noted that the Supreme Court, in the interests of flexibility, already applies an informal or “unprincipled”165
balancing test. For instance, when the Court searches for the presence of state action in a fundamental equal protection case, “such as
the right to buy property asserted in Shelley, the Court will go to
great lengths to find state action.”166 When the Court, however,
searches for the presence of state action in a due process case, particularly a due process case that might modify the property rights of
businesspersons, the Court is reluctant to find state action “even in
the face of formal links between the state and the private actor.”167
VI. CONCLUSION
For the purposes of predictability, unfortunately, the Brentwood
case does not fit squarely into the Court’s informal equal protectiondue process paradigm. With its high regard for flexibility still intact,
however, the Brentwood court could, of course, apply the more

164. Id. at 819–20.
165. See Sue Davis, The Supreme Court: Finding State Action . . . Sometimes, 26 HOW.
L.J. 1395, 1423 (1983).
166. Id. at 1422–23.
167. Id.
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formal balancing approach that this observer advocates. If the Court
adopted such an approach in the Brentwood case, the Court would
weigh, among other factors, the value of Brentwood Academy’s First
Amendment right to send letters to or telephone its accepted students against the value of TSSAA’s need to uniformly enforce its recruiting rule. After developing an appropriate level of factual inquiry
and analyzing the value of the former’s right against the value of the
latter’s challenged practice, the court could reach a conclusion which
would informatively instruct just how the court values the competing
interests in this area. This balancing approach would be consistent
with the approach for which Justice Brennan opined when he declared, “[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the
nonobvious involvement of the state in private conduct be attributed
its true significance.”168
Ultimately, this term’s Supreme Court must sift, weigh, and determine if its Blum-Trilogy-dominated, state action tests’ pendulum
will continue to swing toward elevating form over substance. State
interscholastic athletic associations and their public school and private school constituents await the Court’s decision with interest.
VII. POSTSCRIPT: AWAIT NO LONGER
After this Note was accepted for publication and while it neared
completion of the editing process, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, reversed the Sixth Circuit’s Brentwood decision and held that
TSSAA’s “regulatory activity may and should be treated as state action owing to the pervasive entwinement of state school officials in
the structure of the association . . . .”169 Although the Supreme
Court has ultimately resolved the circuit split on whether a state interscholastic athletic association may be sued for constitutional or §
1983 violations, the high Court muddies nearly as many issues as it
clarifies.

A. A Sigh of Relief
At least for the moment, substance, albeit narrowly, has trumped
over form in determining whether a private entity is a state actor.

168. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (emphasis added).
169. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, No. 99-901, 2001 U.S.
LEXIS 964, at *6 (Feb. 20, 2001) (emphasis added).
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Justice Souter, writing for the narrow majority,170 essentially echoed
this author’s concern that the Court’s recent failures to apply a Mutual Contacts (now denominated by yet another name—
“entwinement”171) test with real teeth172 paves the way for empty
formalistic measures to determine state action.173 Unlike the four dissenters174 who essentially followed the Sixth Circuit’s formalistic approach,175 Justice Souter’s majority substantively recognized TSSAA
as a state actor (1) because public schools comprised 84% of
TSSAA’s voting membership,176 whose representatives met during
school hours just as often as not;177 (2) because the State Board of
Education’s 1996 removal of the Board’s 1972 “designation” of
TSSAA as “the organization to supervise and regulate the athletic activities in which the public junior and senior high schools of Tennessee participate on an interscholastic basis,”178 “affected nothing but
words [because] . . . . [t]he most one can say . . . is that the State
Board once freely acknowledged the Association’s official character
but now does it by winks and nods”;179 (3) because the Sixth Circuit
gave such “short shrift to the language from Tarkanian”180 when, in
fact, the dictum in Tarkanian expressly pointed out the likelihood of
finding state action where an organization’s constituent members are
public schools all within the same state;181 and (4) because the
Court, in its first footnote, implicitly gave deferential consideration

170. Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Ginsburg, and Breyer, delivered the opinion of the Court. See Brentwood, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 964, at *5–*6. As in so
many areas of constitutional law, it appears that Justice O’Connor again provides the swing
vote, this time to the “liberal” side of the Court. See, e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, The Day the Quotas
Died: Affirmative Action’s Posthumous Life, NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 22, 1996, at 21.
171. Brentwood, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 964, at *15–*30.
172. See supra Part V.A.
173. Brentwood, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 964, at *24 n.4.
174. Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Kennedy, wrote the dissenting opinion. See id. at *30.
175. See id. at *32–*41. See supra Part IV for a reminder on how the adoption of a more
formalistic approach, explicitly and impliedly endorsed by the dissenters, creates a method of
analysis which all but ignores the underlying realities between private and state actors.
176. Id. at *7, *19.
177. Id. at *21.
178. Id. at *9 (citing Tenn. Bd. of Educ. Rule 0520-1-2.26 (later moved to Rule 05201-2.08)).
179. Id. at *23–*24 (emphasis added).
180. Id. at *12.
181. See supra Part IV.B.
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to the great weight of cumulative precedent that has consistently
held state athletic associations to be state actors.182 In short, the majority’s conception of the third state action test at least elevates substance or “underlying reality” over mere formality.183
The dissent, on the other hand, applied basically the same cursory analysis that the Sixth Circuit applied.184 When Justice Thomas,
under the Mutual Contacts [or Symbiotic] test, inquired into the
substance of the relationship between TSSAA and the state, he
“analogously” relegated the role of TSSAA to that of “a vendor
[that] could contract with public schools to sell refreshments at
school events.”185 Naturally, TSSAA may take the form of a vendor
at an athletic event; however, TSSAA, in substance, is much more
than a common refreshment vendor when it comes to the underlying
reality prevalent among Tennessee’s interscholastic athletic programs. Again, similar to the Sixth Circuit’s analysis, form trumped
substance under the dissent’s approach.

B. Some Lingering “Muddy” Issues
1. Entwinement
Justice Thomas, for the dissent, perhaps justifiably laments that
the “majority does not define [its new] ‘entwinement [test],’ and the
meaning of the term is not altogether clear.”186 As noted previously,187 the sheer number of state action test labels tossed about in
state action jurisprudence, particularly under the Mutual Contacts
“catch-all” test, is unnecessary. With Brentwood, the Court adds yet
one more theory into the mix. Moreover, “[b]ecause the majority
never defines ‘entwinement,’ the scope of its holding is unclear.”188
The dissent hopes that this entwinement test’s future is dim, and
that, at best, its scope never grows beyond the fact-intensive applica-

182. See Brentwood, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 964, at *12 n.1.
183. See id. at *24 n.4.
184. Compare id. at *36–*41 (Thomas, J., dissenting) with Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn.
Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 180 F.3d 758, 763–67 (6th Cir. 1995). See supra Part IV.
185. Brentwood, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 964, at *41 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at *42 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
187. See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text.
188. Brentwood, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 964, at *47 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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tion it received in Brentwood’s state athletic association context.189
Of course, the dissent’s trouble with the term entwinement may
only be a battle over parsing semantics because it may be asserted
that the entwinement test is not a new test at all. Rather it is just one
more denotation or synonym which may join all the other “catchall” terms such as entanglement, symbiotic, joint action, etc., under
the Mutual Contacts umbrella.190 Just why the majority chose to use
the term entwinement over other previously applied state action
terms, such as entanglement, is unclear.

2. Lack of predictability revisited191
Although, on the whole, a Mutual Contacts test with real bite in
its application is preferable to an empty, formalistic conception of the
test, the Mutual Contacts test’s detractors may now lament an even
greater loss of predictability in state action law. For instance, despite
all of its shortcomings, the developing Blum Trilogy192 trend had at
least one redeeming virtue—budding predictability. Prior to Brentwood, only the limited Nexus [compulsion/coercion] test appeared
to have any bite in its application because the Public Function test
could only be applied in factually limited circumstances and because
the Mutual Contacts test had all but been put to rest in the wake of
the Blum Trilogy.193 With Brentwood, the Blum Trilogy’s predictability has been cut back. Just when the circuits were beginning to
sense some stasis,194 albeit heavily formalistic, the Supreme Court
adds teeth to a test whose bite was all but gone. Held in the light of
the past twenty or so years of Blum Trilogy application, the 5-4
Brentwood decision sends, at best, mixed state action signals to the
lower federal courts. Ultimately, the Court fortuitously holds that
substance should triumph over form in state action jurisprudence but
at the expense of some measure of stasis. Perhaps the only sure thing
in this area of constitutional law is uncertainty.

Josiah N. Drew

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

See id.
See supra note 16.
See supra Part V.B.
See supra note 31.
See supra Part V.A.
See supra Part II.C.2.
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